Progress in informatics and information technology has greatly influenced theoretical psychology. On the other hand, psychological knowledge is increasingly used to support the processes of applying and developing information technology.
Introduction
Progress in informatics and information technology has greatly influenced theoretical psychology. On the other hand, psychological knowledge is increasingly used to support the processes of applying and developing information technology.
In this chapter, I discuss these mutually dependent tendencies from the viewpoint of the psychological theory of activity. I focus on problems and prospects of creativity and creative activity in conditions of rapid development and pervasive implementation of information technology in various spheres of human activity.
The delegation of certain human functions to computers presents the theory of activity with new problems. What is the nature of the activity performed by humans in the context of advanced computerization? I low docs human activity change when humans use computers?
Computer science constantly uses the notions of routine and creative. Focusing on creativity reveals a large gap between psychological studies of activity and psychological studies of creativity. Theories of activity and theories of creativity have developed as separate domains of inquiry. We witness both the tendency of negation of the theory of activity by the theory of creativity and the tendency of negation of the theory of creativity by the theory of activity. It has been claimed that among the most important trends in the development of the psychology of creativity in Russia are the "gradual substitution of the principle of activity by the principle of interaction and...substitution of the activity concept by the systems concept" (Lomov & Anzyferova, 1989, p. 28) .
Are these counterpositions well grounded? In my opinion, they are not. To make the general scientific notion of system absolute for theoretical psychology usually means to ignore the study of specific and concrete systemic characteristics of human psychological functioning. L. S. Vygotsky long ago introduced the notion of psychological system (Tikhomirov, 1989) . He argued for the necessity of distinguishing between qualitatively different systems.
To speak today of the systems concept without differentiating systems according to their types means to go backward from the ideas of Vygotsky. Unfortunately, we sometimes see this happen in today's psychology, including the psychology of creativity. The concept of activity in psychology is 1 systemic concept, for activity is considered as a system (Leont'ev, 1975) . We can compare (or even counterpose) different types of systemic concepts in psychology. Hut to present the systems concept and the concept of activity as opposites is unjustified. This also applies to the counterposition of the categories activity and interaction and activity and communication. Through activity, humans interact with the surrounding world.
Communication is an integral aspect of joint activity. Under certain conditions, communication becomes activity in and for itself (need for communication, communicative goals, etc.) .
The categories of activeness and process are also used as substitutes for the category of activity. However, it is not difficult to see that activity is a specifically human type of activeness and that activity has the character of a process. This means that the concept of process is an aspect of the analysis of activity rather than an alternative to activity. Now let us view the opposite tendency -that of negating by the theory of activity the problems of studying creativity. Here we must consider the contents of the notion theory of activity. This notion includes ideas about the structure of activity, its types, its dynamics and development, its functions, and its mechanisms of realization. The theory of activity contains claims about the relation between activity and its subject and between activity and consciousness. It also includes notions about the functions of the theory of activity, the ways it has developed, and its relation to other psychological theories. General notions about activity have been specified in psychology by differentiating its types: practical and theoretical, external and internal, orienting and performing, individual and collective. Creative activity as an independent activity type is not usually discussed.
In discussions of the general structure of activity, the components of this structure are usually treated as established, not as generated. According la Leont'ev, activity is "a unit of life processed by psychic reflexion, the real function of which is to orientate the subject in the world of objects" (Leont'ev, 1975, p. 82) . However, both reflexion and orientation can exist without distinct phenomena of creativity.
Inconsistency in the development of the concept of activity, demonstrated by a reduction of activity to actions and by neglect of the complexity of motivationalemotional regulation of activity, of the regulation of meanings and goals, also contributes to the negation of the problems of creativity. This situation not only limits (the sphere of applicability of activity theory in psychology but also hinders the solution of new problems -problems that have appeared in the theory and practice of information technology use.
Theory of creative activity
I see the resolution of the problem in a differentiation between creative and routine activities as relatively independent types of activity. Both practical and theoretical activities can be routine or creative. In the context of broad use of information technology, intellectual activity, activity with knowledge, is of primary importance.
The theory of the orientating function of the psyche, the understanding of the psyche as orientating and researching activity, offers a step forward. There are actions with complete and incomplete orientation bases. However, the overrating of complete orientation hinders the understanding of the original character of creative activity. Theoretical and experimental studies show that in solving sufficiently complex problems, complete orientation is impossible. The only possible way to solve these problems is to act on an incomplete orientation basis. Psychological study of orientation should include not only the question of its completeness, but also the stereotypical or nonstereotypical character of orientation (see, e.g., Kaloshina, 1985) .
It is necessary to differentiate between types of psychic reflexion, between processes connected to the existing and those connected to the possible. It is the latter that are specific to creative acts. According to Leont'ev, object-orientedness is the constituting characteristic of activity. The object of activity appears primarily in its independent existence, as subjugating and transforming the subject's activity, and secondarily as the object's image or a product of the psychic reflection of the object's properties, which can only be realized as a result of the subject's activity. In creative activity, the object appears in two other forms: as a new product of activity, a product that didn't exist before, and as an image of a yet to be created object. Whereas in noncreative activity the functions of comparison, reproduction, assimilation, and copying are of primary importance, in creative activity the functions of construction, generation, and creation of the new are most important. Subjectivity is transformed into objectness. It is necessary to differentiate between two types of activity's productivitythe repetitive creation of stereotyped products and the creation of new; original ones.
Creative activity is characterized not only by motives, goals, and operations (which exist also in routine activity), but also by acts generating new motives, goals, and operations. This activity undergoes functional development in the course of its realization. Creative activity can be defined as a unit of life that includes the generation of new psychic formations, the real function of which is giving humans the opportunity to generate a new world of objects. New psychic formations in activity precede and prepare the production of new, tangible results (products) of activity.
New needs and new motives are important sources of creative activity. Initial motivation can change in the course of activity. Hierarchical relations between motives can also change. Motives are not just conditions for developing actual intellectual activity, but also factors influencing its productivity and structure. Motivation is characterized not only by the content but also by the dynamics and level of development.
The functional development of cognitive needs (study by E. E. Vasiukova, unpublished data) is characterized by changes in the objective content (type of knowledge), in the dynamic properties (stability), in relations with other needs and in the level of realization. In this development we can isolate different specific levels of micro-and macrogenesis. The generation and characteristics of cognitive need, which appears in a concrete situation, depend not only on the exposition of the subject to the noncorrespondence of his or her known methods of action to the requirements of the problem, hut also on the general level of the development of the subject's stable cognitive need. The general level of the development of a stable cognitive need defines the correlation between reproductive and creative components of intellectual activitythe level of its "creativity" rises with the rise of this level.
Studies of creative activity demand an analysis of the relations between activity and personality in a specific creative act. I. L. Zinovieva (unpublished data) studied these relations, specifically the dependence of intellectual activity's organization on the level of the subject's confidence. It appeared that the confident subjects had a higher goal orientation, which leads to the "cutting off" -by way of categorical evaluationsof the hypotheses of all information that does not lead to the goal, as well as higher trust in existing conclusions and higher integration between generalizations. The nonconfident subjects demonstrated chaotic and disintegrated organization of the search, the result of approximate evaluations of the value of the components in the field of meanings, which generates numerous directions of the search having equal attractiveness -and this hinders effective completion of the goal.
A study by I. A. Vassiliev and N. N. Khussainova (unpublished data) showed that personality determines the level of the organization of creative activity and activity's field of meaning (objective content of the problem, subjective-objective content of the problem, broader life context). The psychological mechanisms of "escapes" from creative activity devoted to the solution of a specific problem include broadening the activity's field of meaning beyond the objective content of the problem, that is, the inclusion of the "I," the experimenter and broader life context in the activity as meaningful reference points. A typology of escapes from creative intellectual activity was established by the direction of the escape into one of the fields of meaning.
Goal formation (generation of new goals in the subject's activity) is one of the central acts in the structure of creative activity. The term goal defines the image of the future desirable results indirectly connected with the motive. The achieved result of the action always contains something new in relation to the goal: by-products of a goaloriented action, results of involuntary activeness of the subject. Besides needs and motives, the prerequisites of the generation of new goals in individual creative activity include (1) the assimilation of new knowledge about possible goals (results); (2) the reception of new demands for action; (3) the appearance of new results of individual actions; (4) the nonachievement of the anticipated results; and (5) the appearance of new, unrealized anticipations of the future results of the action. Transformation of demands into individual goals is one of the common variants of goal formation. In independent goal formation (i.e., when a directly formulated demand is lacking), the process can develop voluntarily or involuntarily 1988, pp. 111-152) .
Among the psychological mechanisms of goal formation are (I) transformation of motives into motive-goals with their realization; (2) transformation of by-products of action into goals by connecting them with the motive and realization of the result; (3) transformation of unrealized results into realized results; (4) isolation of intermediary goals as a function of an obstacle; (5) joint practical activity; (6) correlation of the object with several needs; and (7) partial satisfaction of the need by the object of this need (Tikhomirov, 1988, pp. 111-152) .
In 1975 Leont'ev wrote that goal formation is "a process almost not studied at all" (p. 106). Today the situation is different. Among the objects of research are the role of motives and emotions in the acts of goal formation, the role of evaluations of the available possibilities of the object situation and of the perspectives of its transformation, the role of the evaluations of the attainability of the anticipated result, the role of memory, and the dependence of goal formation on meaning formation (Tikhomirov, 1988) .
Studies of the operational content of activity include analysis of the generation of nonverbalized research operations, factors of their organization, and interrelations with verbalized operations. Differentiation between creative and routine activity demands not only a new approach to the traditional units of activity analysis from the viewpoint of their generation in the course of activity's self-development, but also the isolation of new components. Let me mention just two examples.
Studies of creative intellectual activity have shown that this activity includes both processes subjected to a conscious goal and nonverbalized anticipations of future results. The latter processes can be more intense than the goal-oriented actions themselves. Experimental studies of the generation of intermediary goals have demonstrated that nonverbalized anticipations may precede the formation of a new conscious goal, coexist with this goal and even behind it. Studies of goal formation have also shown that in the formation and functioning of the conscious goal, evaluations of the attainability of the result, unrealized by the subject, join in. An important place in the analysis of creative activity belongs to studies of its emotional regulation. The following parameters are central in these analyses: (1) emotional saturation of the activity, (2) objective content (direction) of emotions, (3) characteristics of emotional fixation, (4) emotional targeting and correction, and (5) emotions' modality. Creative activity is characterized by the generation and complex dynamics of emotional evaluations, which appear as a new formation, no less meaningful than motives and goals (Tikhomirov, 1988, pp. 91-110) .
Concrete human activity includes an "amalgamation" of creative and noncreative components. Depending on their domination, one can speak of a predominantly creative or noncreative activity. Attempts to proclaim every activity creative contradict the realities of division of labor in the society.
Psychological effects of the computerization of activity
Creative activity, while remaining the prerogative of humans, is considerably changed in the context of computer use. In conditions of computerization, a real development of creative activity can be witnessed. New forms of creative work, education, and play appear, forms that are simply impossible without computers. At the same time, new types of stereotyped, routine activity appear.
Computerization typically entails sharp increases in external prestige motivation, as well as intensive development of personality's cognitive needs. We witness both fear of using computers and the unbridled optimism connected with their use. A transformation takes place in the whole system of motives, stable meanings of personality, and personality's goals in participating in the regulation of creative activity. One can also note a double tendency toward broadening the possibilities of creating and attaining goals, on the one hand, and toward narrowing these processes, on the other hand.
The contradictory character of the psychological effects of computerization makes it necessary to analyze these effects in a concrete fashion, to work purposefully toward positive results, and to correct possible negative consequences. All this demands a differentiated analysis with regard to different professional, ethnic, and age groups, as well as to computers of different types and generations, different languages and principles of programming. The computer is not only a universal data-processing device, it is also a universal means of influencing human activity and, consequently, the human psyche. This influence can be bulb purposeful and spontaneous. The specific character of such influence is defined, first of all, not by a computer, but by the organizational and social conditions of its use and by the characteristics of the activity.
Experimental psychological studies of goal formation as a manifestation of creativity in the dialogue with computers have shown the potential of broadening human creative activity. This potential is expressed in an increase in the number of formulated goals and in the heightening of their originality. It has been also demonstrated that the use of computers leads to a qualitative transformation of goal formation processes, manifested in new properties of the object situation that are unapproachable without computers. This change is also manifested in the broadening of the zone of independent selective search. At the same time, studies have shown that the development of creative activity in the computerized context can be considerably enhanced with the help of psychological maintenance of computerization. In the opposite case, there is a likelihood of the formation of a stereotyped, elicited thinking supported by the computer's "authority" (Tikhomirov, 1988, pp. 180-190) .
In performing any of the social roles when participating in a joint activity, one can isolate both routine and creative components. The transfer of routine components to the computer means its inclusion in the performance of a social role -and, consequently, the transformation of the content of the social roles. New roles appear. Tikhomirov and Gurieva (1989) studied the psychological effects of computerization of the activity of psychodiagnosticians. The study included an analysis of the transformation of the motives of computerized activity, the changes in the processes of goal formation in this activity, and the changes in its operational content. The study used three evaluation scales: "positive vs. negative" effects, "real vs. potential" effects, and "governed vs. ungoverned" effects.
Real positive changes in the motivation of the psychodiagnosticians were expressed in the formation of "known" motives connected to the advantages of computer use. This manifested itself in the admission of the computer as a means and in the trust in its data.
Real negative changes in motivation were generated by the realization of computers' limited abilities in solving problems and by the discovery of technical defects in computers. The phenomena of "psychological barrier" and "hypertrust" were observed.
Potential positive changes in motivation consisted in the affirmation of the professional value of (he psychodiagnosticians and in an emphasis on their responsibility for the results of computerized psychodiagnostics. Potential negative changes in motivation are based on faulty assessments of the importance of computer use in psychodiagnostic studies, which can lead to a broad dissemination of incorrect psychodiagnostic decisions.
Real positive changes in goal formation were connected to the reduction of certain stereotyped goals in the interpretation of test results and to the development of such goals as nonformalized analysis of test data, more qualitative interviews with the examined person, and a greater number of interviews in a specific period of time. More attention was paid to the concretization and specification of the goals initially formulated in a general form. The level of prognostic goal formation was rising.
Among real negative changes in goal formation were the setting of goals connected to the preparation, regulation, and control of the computer's results in the process of solving a psychodiagnostic problem (these computer-specific goals, though necessary to attain a productive result, have a less meaningful and auxiliary character; they make the achievement of a productive result more complex). Computerized testing of the examined persons without preliminary preparation makes them constrained and produces in them a fear of the computer as a technical device. This leads to unauthentic data or to a refusal to work with the computer. At this stage, a combination of manual and computerized types of activity makes it possible to optimize the process, but it simultaneously leads to lower productivity.
Potential positive changes in goal formation may consist in an optimal prevalence of creative components of computerized psychodiagnostic activity over the stereotyped components. Potential negative changes in goal formation are connected to setting inadequate or unrealistic goals -for example, the goal of full substitution of the psychodiagnostician by a computer.
Real positive changes in the activity's operational content consist in the reduction of the operational load and in the possibility of using the results of more perfect operations carried out by the computer. Real negative changes in the activity's operational content include new types of operations constituting auxiliary work with comparatively low social value and inefficiently performed sensomotoric operations, produced by inconvenient data presentation on the display, irrational organization of the computer keyboard, and deficient instructions and manuals. The tempo of operations dictated by the computer can also be negative.
Potential positive changes in the activity's operational content are noted in the course of learning, rationalization of the display, and the user's work routines. Potential negative changes in the operational content can consist in an inadequate evaluation of the importance of operations for efficient psychodiagnostic activity, which may lead to a lack of convergence between real and expected results and to the formation of hypertrust in computer data.
Activity theory and theory of artificial intelligence
Recent decades have seen an intensive interaction between psychology and the theory of artificial intelligence. Both psychologists and cognitive scientists have made many attempts to use the apparatus of artificial intelligence and the operational principles of artificial systems in the study of cognition, creativity, and behavior.
One manifestation of the influence of the theory of artificial intelligence is broad dissemination of ideas about creativity and activity as processes of algorithm realization. An algorithm is an instruction, the fulfillment of which guarantees the solution of a certain class of problems. This fulfilling of an instruction is sometimes declared to be an act of creativity and a model of human activity.
Our concept of creative activity can be interpreted as a nonalgorithmic model of creativity (Ponomarev & Saarinen. 1986, pp. 1-8) . Creative activity is in a sense contrary to an algorithm, an "antialgorithm." The nonalgorithmic nature of motivational-emotional regulation is expressed in the fact that the need proper (as an unspecified slate of want) lacks the "rules" of need's transfer into motive, which appears only as a result of a meeting between a need and the object of its satisfaction. The widening of the so-called insatiable needs -which include cognitive needs -is also not preprogrammed into the properties of needs. Relations between motives are also not fixed. They are established and changed in the course of activity's realization and can be especially complex in the situation of conflicting motives. Generation and transformation of emotional evaluations in activity are also not algorithmic. Relations between motives and goals can also be nonalgorithmic. The relation between goals and motives is especially ambiguous in situations of goal formation. The process of need satisfaction does not necessarily include the isolation of conscious goals. The transition from motive to goal and the goal formation process proper do not have an algorithmic character.
The theory of heuristic programming as part of the theory of artificial intelligence has attracted attention to the heuristic organization of the human search for solutions. Usually no consideration is given to the difference between formal and nonformal heuristic principles, selective mechanisms that can work on both verbalized and nonverbalized levels. The change in these mechanisms, the transition from one search zone to another, is an important trait of creative activity.
Let us now consider certain new aspects of the analysis of traditional structural components of activity. These new aspects become manifest as a result of interaction between activity theory and the theory of artificial intelligence.
Operations in the functioning of an artificial intelligence system differ from operations in the structure of human activity. Not all of the latter can be transferred to artificial systems. Human operations are not only performed, but also generated and transformed.
The term goal, which denotes the differentiating characteristic of action in the theory of activity, is also used in the theory of artificial intelligence. However, there it has a different meaning: a finite situation, set by a Formal description (e.g., in the form of a list of indications), and achieved during the functioning of a certain system. In this context the goal loses its connection to the motive, which is crucial in the theory of activity.
Comparison of the motivational-emotional regulation of creative activity with the evaluating functions of artificial intelligence systems shows that humans use not only constant but also situationally occurring and dynamically changing evaluations. There is a considerable difference between verbal-logical and emotional evaluations. As to needs and motives, they are absent in artificial systems -which constitutes the main difference between the work of a human and that of a machine, a difference central to the theory of activity.
Taking into consideration the active development of expert systems, it is necessary to discuss the correlation between the categories "knowledge" and "activity". Knowledge can be a specific product initially generated by human thinking activity and a means of performing this activity. Knowledge can be reproduced -as in reproduction proper or in recalling. Along with formalized, easily described knowledge, there exists nonformalized (or ill-formalized) knowledge. It includes mundane notions, empirical generalizations, and complexes, which should not be regarded as second-rate.
From the viewpoint of the theory of creative activity, even such complex information technologies as expert systems do not reproduce human activity, though they transform it. Needs, goal formation, and the generation of emotional evaluations remain specifically human characteristics. However, activity theory and the theory of artificial intelligence are united by the necessity to develop a theory of activities that use artificial intelligence systems.
The dialogue between human and computer is characterized by the emerging personification of the computer, that is, its perception as an entity with certain personal traits and conscious properties and its corresponding treatment. Interaction between the human operator and the computer takes on more and more traits of joint activity (cooperation or rivalry). The need for communication with the computer is actualized. A motive of competition with the computer appears, manifested in the formation of goals such as "to win over the machine," "to take revenge on the machine," and so on.
The notion of artificial is connected with more than the discussion of computers' possibilities. Generally, this term denotes everything created by humans (Simon, 1969) . Correlation of the artificial and nonartificial in human intellectual activity constitutes an important scientific problem, which can be reformulated as the problem of correlation between routine and creative processes. The former can be artificial, as they are produced by other people and adopted by the individual. The nonartificial in intellectual activity is not limited, in our opinion, to the natural prerequisites of this activity (Simon, 1969) ; it also relates to the new formations appearing in the course of activity. To ignore this type of the nonartificial is to ignore the creative nature of human intellectual activity.
In this context, it is necessary to specify the role of instruction in intellectual development, the thesis about the mind's social and historical development, with which the theory of activity is traditionally associated. The content of individual human experience includes not only mastered social experience, but also personal experience, the experience of an activity's realization, which determines the readiness and selectiveness of acquisition.
Social experience is transferred not only to other people, but also to information technology -for instance, in the form of computer programs. In this connection, we must differentiate between the processes of "appropriation" of social experience by a human being and by a computer. Such differentiation is decisive for the evaluation of the concept of psychology as a "science of the artificial"; it leads to broader notions about the functions of human activity.
In successfully acquiring and mastering specific social experience, a human being also accumulates certain personal experience -for example, in the form of traces of emotional experiences generated by the first acquaintance with the material, by deeper acquaintance with the material, and so on. One of the regularities of individual psychological development is that in appropriating sociohistorical experience, one also acquires individual experience:. This annuls both counterposition and identification of social and individual experience, as well as differentiating between the processes of appropriation of social experience by humans and by computers.
Conscious intellectual activity of human beings is governed by objective circumstances, that is, those not dependent on the will of persons living in society, selling certain goals and attaining these goals, never able to foresee all the consequences of their actions. This thesis remains valid in regard to instructional and educational activity, and does not allow us to adopt the opinion that a single person's activity and psyche are nothing more than the product of surrounding people, that they are artificial. From the viewpoint of the theory of creative activity, psychology cannot be regarded as a science of the artificial.
Conclusion
The development of informatics and information technology not only produces considerable changes in human activity, it requires development of the theory of activity. This theory has a new function: to interpret the psychological nature of human activity in the information society and the challenges it presents to the development of psychological science. Tikhomirov, O. K., & Gurieva, L. P. (1989) 
